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The Takeaway © Mosbacher Institute 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have grown in populari-
ty as a method to leverage private-sector actors in the pro-
duction of government services. With the global challenge 
of water insecurity, PPPs are becoming more common for 
large-scale water infrastructure projects such as desalina-
tion. Desalination facilities are complex and expensive op-
erations, which means that understanding the appropriate 
context for PPPs is increasingly important.  
Traditionally, governments fund the cost of new water infra-
structure by issuing debt and repaying that debt with water 
fees and taxes. The rising costs of infrastructure, increasing 
water scarcity, and financial constraints of governments have 
led to the consideration of non-traditional financial innova-
tions, one of which is public-private partnerships (PPPs). 
While PPPs are most commonly used for housing and trans-
portation infrastructure, state and local governments are in-
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
PPPs shift costs and risks of 
desalination facilities between 
public and private sector 
partners. 
PPP structures differ across 
regions based on the needs and 
risk preferences of communities. 
Whether PPPs should be used, 
should be based on how much 
public entities want to shift the 
financial risks and control of  
core public assets to private 
organizations. 
PPPs are not a “one size fits all” 
solution and may not be 
appropriate in every scenario.  
Desalination plant Carlsbad, California 
2 creasingly turning toward PPPs to offset the 
high cost of desalination stemming from both 
facility construction and maintenance.  
To understand how different PPP arrange-
ments are used in the water sector, a team of 
researchers at Texas A&M University examined 
the global desalination sector and select cities 
around the world using PPPs for desalination.1 
This brief summarizes what they learned about 
how risks are shared between the private and 
public sector, how those risks vary globally, and 
current trends in water infrastructure finance.  
DESALINATION 
Desalination is a growing industry around the 
world as arid regions with water scarcity con-
cerns seek alternative sources for water. The 
desalination process removes salts and miner-
als from seawater and brackish water, making 
otherwise unusable water drinkable. However, 
the process is costly, energy intensive, and re-
quires specialized knowledge. In 1996, there 
were only 92 plants globally mostly located in 
the Middle East. Today, due to technological 
advances that make the process more accessi-
ble, there are more than 15,000 plants world-
wide.  
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
Public-private partnerships are joint arrange-
ments between the public and private sector to 
work toward a common goal while sharing the 
risks, resources, and liabilities of the projects. 
Depending on the model, the contracts transfer 
various risks and responsibilities from public 
agencies to private firms. A key risk factor for 
water infrastructure is demand and revenue. 
Common PPP structures and their level of 
transferred financial risk are shown in Table 1. 
PPPs also have shifts in equity, affordability, 
access, and sustainability of water infrastruc-
ture—which may or may not benefit the public. 
These shifts have largely been unstudied in the 
PPP context, especially in the water sector.  
PPP TRENDS IN DESALINATION 
The most common PPPs in the desalination in-
dustry are Build-Own-Operate (BOO) and Build
-Operate-Transfer (BOT) arrangements, but 
PPP structures tend to vary by geographic re-
gion. The BOT model is most prominent in the 
Middle East and North Africa; Design-Build 
(DB) is most common in North America; and 
Design-Build-Operate (DBO) is preferred in 





























































Note: Figure modified from Page et al. (2008) incorporating information from Algarni, Arditi, & Polat (2007) and the 
authors’ own observations.  
Type Description Financial Risk Transfer 
Design-Build 
(DB) 





Public entity owns and finances the construction, but the private 
entity designs, builds, and operates the asset to an agreed upon 
level of output.  
Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) 
Private entity is responsible for the design, construction, opera-




The private partner owns the facility and is assigned all operating 
revenue risk and any surplus revenues for the life of the facility. 
 
Table 1: Public Private Partnership Forms and Revenue Risk Transfers  
Using global desalination data we find that 
2.7% of all desalination projects use some PPP 
arrangement, which is similar to large scale in-
frastructure projects in other sectors. The sig-
nificant growth in the use of PPPs, especially 
since 2000 (as shown in Figure 1), also follows 
the overall trend of infrastructure projects ex-
ploring partnerships during that time. Most fre-
quently, PPPs were used for large projects—
approximately 30% of extra-large projects 
(producing 50,000 m3/day or more of desali-
nated water) and 12% of large projects use 
PPPs, compared to only 2% of medium projects. 
PPPs are also more common for seawater de-
salination than other types of desalination. Mu-
nicipalities are the most common government 
entity to use PPPs for desalination projects.  
CASE STUDIES 
For a more in-depth look at how PPPs are used 
in different countries, the Texas A&M research 
team conducted case studies in several coun-
tries around the world. The selected sites were  
in semi-arid regions that adopted desalination 
early and face water scarcity challenges due to 
climate change and population growth, but dif-
fer in their institutional governance models for 
water. Israel, for example, has highly central-
ized governance. The state owns all the coun-
try’s water and has authority in deciding where 
the next facility will be built and for soliciting 
bids from private corporations. In their PPP 
deals, they prefer the BOT model, and water is 
purchased by the state at a fixed amount even if 
it is not needed immediately. This has the bene-
fit of increased revenue stability for the private 
sector partner and gives more of an incentive 
for facilities to remain operational all year long. 
After 25 years of ownership, the facility is 
transferred back to the government which then 
has the option to enter into a new contract with 
a private entity for operation.  
The most decentralized and fragmented institu-
tional arrangement of the case sites is the Carls-
bad facility in southern California. This facility 
has a DBO arrangement where water from the 
plant is purchased by the San Diego County Wa-
ter Authority (SDCWA), which is an independ-
ent water authority. SDCWA then sells water to 
cities. Similar to Israel, the SDCWA contract 
guarantees a minimum level of water they will 
purchase from the private company. But, the 
DBO model ensures that the SDCWA does not 
have any liability or financial risk in the design. 
After ten years, SDCWA can assume ownership 
of the plant. Institutional arrangements of this 
type add additional layers of political and finan-
cial risk for both public and private partners.  
CONCLUSION 
The decision to use a PPP for large-scale water 
infrastructure such as desalination depends on 
specific goals, operating environment, and risk 
levels. The cases demonstrate different meth-






























































Figure 1: The total number of all desalination 
projects and PPP projects per year (1945-2019)  
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Global 
Water Intelligence’s www.DesalData.com 
construction and maintenance of water infra-
structure. The institutional arrangements range 
from highly centralized funding and negotiating 
power at the national level as in Israel, to highly 
decentralized and fragmented where the role of 
local governments greatly increases as in Cali-
fornia. These varying institutional arrange-
ments and country-specific laws influence the 
types of PPP arrangements that are likely to be 
implemented. Despite the potential benefits of 
PPPs in the desalination sector, some potential 
downsides include the possibility of a high total 
cost, financial risks from debt and default, and 
political risks from public perceptions. There 
also may be obstacles to establishing partner-
ships initially, legal hurdles, and regulatory bar-
riers. Establishing PPPs can be difficult due to 
the need for public support and special legisla-
tion. An enabling regulatory, legal, and political 
environment is necessary for success. 
Ultimately, whether or not a public-private 
partnership is a good fit for a particular project 
depends on the amount of risk the public and 
private sector are willing to accept for the pro-
ject. A variety of risk factors exist including en-
vironmental, political, and financial, which are 
likely to be case specific depending on geogra-
phy, water scarcity, political will, and fiscal 
health. Currently, PPPs in water infrastructure 
are understudied. More research is needed in 
order for government leaders to make in-
formed decisions about PPPs and new water 
infrastructure, including research on what 
models of PPPs are most successful and how 
geographic regions influence model success. By 
understanding the risks and benefits of each 
PPP model, municipalities and governments 
can determine what model will have the most 
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